ABSTRACT This paper proposes three hierarchical levels of a competitive big-data market model. We consider that a service provider gathers data from multiple data sources and provides valuable information from refined data as a service to its customers. Under our approach, a service provider determines optimal data procurement from multiple data sources within its budget constraint. The multiple data sources follow the service provider's action by independently submitting bidding prices to the service provider. Further, customers decide whether to subscribe or not based on the subscription fee, their willingness-to-pay, and the quality of the refined data. We study the economic benefits of such a market model by analyzing the hierarchical decision making procedures as a Stackelberg game. We show the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE), and the NE solution is given as a closed form. Finally, we reveal that the obtained unique equilibrium solution maximizes the payoff of all market participants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to continuing developments in sensor technologies, inexpensive storage and processing capabilities, large or complex data sets from various sources (i.e., Internet of Things (IoT), social networks, and crowdsourcing), which are known as big-data, have witnessed an explosive increase [1] , [2] . Using modern machine learning technologies [3] , [4] , such big-data should be cost-effectively collected [5] - [8] stored [9] - [14] and analyzed to extract valuable knowledge and information. For instance, valuable knowledge and information from big-data can be used to understand media content usage patterns in the media industry and pre-trade decision-support analytics in banking etc.
These perspectives can be understood as showing that valuable information from big-data can be sold or provided to customers as a service that produces profit [15] . This concept has been recently introduced as data-as-a-service (DaaS) [16] . Hence, to maximize the information value of collected data, various forms of data management problems have been studied in the literature taking into account characteristics of data, such as leakage problems, possibility of replication, and data exclusivity [17] - [21] . Nevertheless, due to the limited amount of data that can be collected from a single company, it is challenging to maximize the satisfaction of service users. Accordingly, it is obvious that, for optimal data management, the data market needs to embrace open data-trading. This concern has recently motivated studies of market-based data trading model among market participants for the big-data era; such studies should enable a more effective utilization of data sources through the creation of a data market [3] , [11] , [22] - [29] . Specifically, various market structures for data trading such as a monopoly market, oligopoly market and single/double side auction market were introduced in [23] . The effect of bundling data to form a coalition of multiple service providers has been analyzed in [24] . This study reveals that a bundling strategy can attract more customers and achieve higher revenue. Lately, by considering competitive market models among multiple market participants, which can be modeled using a non-cooperative market model, analytic research has been suggested in [3] and [28] . As a first approach to designing a non-cooperative data trading market model, Niyato et al. [3] modeled a simple market form that consists of the data source, service provider, and service customers, and designs their interactions. They separate the role of service provider and data source; the service provider purchases raw data from the data source, and then extracts useful information from the data, and finally provides it to customers. They assume that all collected data is stored in a single data source. Thus, there is no competition among data source providers and willingness-to-pay (WTP) of the customers is assumed to be uniform. As a work to extend [3] , an auction based market model was proposed by Jiao et al. [28] under the same market structure as that used in [3] . In that study, customers bid a service fee to a service provider, and the service provider adopts an optimal bidding value to maximize its profit. In this process, the service provider uses Bayesian-optimal mechanisms to optimize the data size and the unit price of the data.
All previous works on competitive data trading market models have adopted single data source and analyzed interaction between service provider under single data source and customers. However, as suggested in [24] , to design a competitive data trading market and maximize revenue from valuable information, bundling from multiple data sources should be considered. Hence, in this paper, we addresses a data trading problem in which a service provider gathers data from multiple data sources and provides valuable information from refined data as a service to its customers. We consider that multiple data sources conduct a data bidding competition to maximize their own revenue by considering the budget suggested by the service provider. And, customers decide whether to subscribe or not based on the subscription fee, WTP, and the quality of the refined data. Finally, three hierarchical levels of multiple data sources, a service provider and customers are modeled based on Stackelberg game theory. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• This paper designs three hierarchical levels of a competitive data trading market model. Specifically, in order to resolve the limitation of previous works [3] , we consider multiple data sources and a service provider that can gather data from multiple sources.
• Under a budget constraint proposed by the service provider, optimal data procurement from multiple data sources is obtained by the proposed algorithm. In details, customers decide whether to subscribe or not based on the subscription fee, WTP, and the quality of the refined data. The advantage of the proposed algorithm is that the service provider can estimate how much data will be collected in its budget constraint to maximize its benefit.
• The economic benefits of this trading mechanism are studied by analyzing the decision-making procedures of the data source, the service provider and the customers. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game. The existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) are shown, and a closed form solution of the NE is obtained. Also, we show that obtained unique equilibrium solution maximizes the payoff of all market participants.
• The proposed WTP of subscription is designed to be more realistically than in [3] and [28] . In the previous works, WTP was assumed to be uniformly distributed.
That is not only unrealistic, but also an example of very simple modeling, which is optimized at half of the maximum value of WTP. Here, we constructed the probability density function of the WTP to follow the log-normal distribution [30] . By adopting the realistic WTP, we can calculate the expected subscribers more practically. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents an overview of our big-data market model and introduces some common notations. Section III formulates data trading between multiple data sources and service provider, and prove that there exists a unique NE. Section IV formulates the profit function of the service provider and solves an optimization problem. Some numerical results are presented in Section V, and finally, this paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present a data market model consisting of three groups that behave for their own benefit: R data sources
, a single service provider, and C customers. The overall structure of our system model is described in Figure 1 . In addition, since there are many newly defined variables, we provide symbol tables in this paper in Table 1 for the convenience of the reader.
The interaction between these three groups can be explained by the Stackelberg game model, which will be described in detail below. Moreover, we describe how the proposed model is improved over that used in previous works.
In our data market model, there are two competitions and one optimization among these three groups. The first competition is that within the group of the data sources. Each data source gathers raw data such as CCTV video data, weather data, GPS data and so on. Data sources compete by bidding for their raw data simultaneously; this can be described as a normal form game. In other words, the data source DS i chooses a data bid without knowing the others' bids.
The second competition is that between the data sources and the service provider. The service provider determines a budget B for obtaining raw data n = R i=1 n i from the data sources. On the other hand, each data source provides raw data to the service provider and, as a result, the revenue of each is determined. In this case, the service provider allocates the budget to the data sources proportionally. In other words, let the amount of data provided by DS i be the n i , the revenue b i is defined as
Note that R j=1 n j B implies an unit price of the data, and the sum of all b i cannot exceed budget B.
The last item is optimization from the perspective of the service provider, which it does to maximize its own profit. The service provider acquires raw data from data sources, and performs data processing through the machine learning algorithm. Then, the service provider provides the refined data to customers, and optimizes the budget B and subscription fee s. On the other hand, the customers decide whether to subscribe based on the subscription fee, WTP, and the quality of the refined data. Now, with a flow chart, we analyze how the proposed system model works in a sequential manner, and show that it can be modeled as a three hierarchical level one-leadermultiple-followers Stackelberg game. Prior to providing a description of our model, a one-leader-multiple-followers Stackelberg game model has one leader and multiple followers. The leader can determine his strategy before the multiple followers choose their strategies; thus, he can predict the strategy to be chosen by the followers so that he has a favorable position to maximize his own interests. Then, considering the leader's chosen strategy, the followers compete with each other to choose strategies that maximize their own benefit; the competition of followers is typically modeled as a strategic form game.
First, through an algorithm that will be proposed in this paper, the service provider determines the budget B and subscription fee s that maximize its revenue. Here, the service provider plays a role of leader in the Stackelberg game, since leader chooses its own best strategy, anticipating the data sources' actions with WTP distribution. Next, the service provider informs the data sources of its determined budget B; then, the data sources compete with each other by proposing their raw data to the service provider to obatain budget B. Because they compete after the service provider's decision, they play roles as followers in the Stackelberg game; and this competition can be modeled as a strategic form game. Now, the service provider distributes the budget to the data sources as a percentage of the data received, and refines the data to be sold to the customers. Subsequently, the customers decide to subscribe according to the subscription fee, WTP, and the quality of the data set by the service provider. The cycle of the proposed system model is shown in Fig 2. 
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, to prove the existence and uniqueness of NE, we focus on an analysis of the Stackelberg game in the proposed model. Note that each data source acts to maximize its cost-effectiveness, so we introduce a utility function to explain it mathematically. Before defining the utility function, we assume commonly used conditions of the utility function: continuously differentiable, strict concavity. To define the utility function U i for DS i , the input is of course n i , but the output has another factor to be considered together with (1) . Even though each data source DS i receives b i as revenue, there is a risk of data leakage. Because data is easy to copy or disseminate, once data is leaked, the data will be inevitably devalued. Therefore, we denote γ i as a weight factor to quantify the risk of the data leakage of DS i .
Definition 1: For fixed budget B, utility function of DS i is defined as
where non-negative n i and weight factor γ i ∈ [0, 1].
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Definition 2: A Stackelberg game between data sources and service provider is defined by maximizing (U
i is the NE of U i , it satisfies such following inequality for all i:
We now prove the existence and uniqueness of NE n * for maximizing (U i ) R i=1 . In this case, there has been similar works to find the NE in various models [31] - [33] . Especially, Hajek and Gopalakrishnan [32] , Johari and Tsitsiklis [33] propose a price anticipating model; they show the existence and uniqueness of NE in their model. Therefore, we adapt Johari's result and present the main theorem in the section below.
Lemma 1: The vector n is a NE(i.e., n * ) of the game to maximize (U i ) R i=1 if and only if at least two components of n are positive, and the vector n satisfies a following conditions:
Proof: (⇒) First, we suppose that n * is a NE. If n * is a zero vector, then it satisfies U i (n; ) > U i (n * ; ) = 0 for all n > 0. So it contradicts to definition of NE. If only one component of n * is positive and let n * i > 0 be the only one positive point.
, n * −j ; ) = 0 for all j = i, so it contradicts to continuously differentiable utility function. Therefore, n * has at least two positive components.
According to assumption of utility function, U i is strictly concave, and continuously differentiable. Thus n * is the unique maximizer over U i , so n * satisfies the following conditions: (2) can be obtained by simple math.
(⇐) Conversely, we suppose that n has at least two positive components, and satisfies the equation (2) . By the first condition, it is satisfied to
is strictly concave and continuously differentiable function. Therefore, U i (n i , n −i ; ) is also strictly concave and continuously differentiable function.
Moreover, the second condition (2) implies that n is a maximizer of U i (n i , n −i ; ), thus n is a NE.
Here we define a new game and a new utility function U to prove the original game. We will prove the new game, and then solve the original game by finding a correlation between the new game and the original game. (1) , there exists a unique NE of following game. GAME :
Theorem 1: For the vector
Proof: The utility function U i is a quadratic function of b i , so it is easy to show that U i is a non-negative, strictly increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable on [0, B] . Furthermore, the domain set [0, B] is a convex, closed, and bounded in the Euclidean space. Thus there exists a unique NE of the game by Rosen [34] .
Corollary 1: Suppose that b * is a NE of the game (3) , then it satisfies the following conditions for some ρ
Proof: The first and second conditions occur naturally as a result of NE b * in (3). Also, since U i is a strictly increasing function, the last condition is needed.
Theorem 1 shows the existence and uniqueness of the NE b * for the new game, and Corollary 1 gives three conditions that are satisfied by b * . Through these theorems, it is possible to solve the original game by finding the relation between b * and n * . Now let's look at the relation in the next theorem.
Theorem 2: Suppose that b * is a NE of the game (3) , then there exists a unique NE n * of the game to maximize (U i ) R i=1 . Proof: Let n * = ρb * , where (b * , ρ) are satisfying (4). We claim that n * is a NE, thus we check two sufficient conditions by Lemma 1. First, if n * is a zero vector, then b * is as well. It satisfies U i (b; ) > U i (b * ; ), for all b > 0, so it contradicts to definition of NE. If only one component of n * is positive, then b * is as well. Let b * i > 0 be the only one positive point, then b * i = B, and ρ = 0 are derived from (4). But U i (0) > 0 = ρ, so it contradicts to second condition of (4). Therefore, n * has at least two positive components and in this case, ρ > 0.
Following check the other sufficient condition. We describe first and second conditions of (4) over ρb * i as below.
Thus, the second sufficient condition of (2) is derived from (5) by substitution b * i to (1) . In this case, the comparison of (2) and (5) makes it easy to find out ρ:
Therefore, since n * satisfies two sufficient conditions of Lemma 1, n * is NE. Moreover, since b * is a unique solution of the game (3), n * = ρb * is a unique NE as well. Theorem 2 shows the existence and uniqueness of NE n * of the Stackelberg game defined at Definition 2. Now we evaluate the exact value of b * by using the Karush-KuhnTucker(KKT) conditions [35] . 
where ν is derived by KKT conditions and evaluated later at Corollary 2. Proof: For evaluating b * , we will prove the constraints (4) . Since the U is a strictly increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable function on [0, B], the constraints (4) are satisfy the KKT conditions. Therefore, for each NE point b * i , there exist λ i ∈ R and ν ∈ R such that:
From the above conditions, we introduce two more conditions for convenience. First, (9) makes an equation of λ i and substitutes to (7), thus we obtain an following equation.
Otherwise, (9) makes an equation of λ i and substitutes to (7), thus we obtain an following equation.
Now to derive the exact b * i , we prove by splitting two cases about ν. First, suppose ν < is derived by (9) . Therefore we
As a result,
Note that the bidding of data sources is non-negative by Definition 1. But suppose that ith data source DS i shall not start a bidding, i.e., n i = 0. In this situation, bidding doesn't affect either the other data sources or the service provider, because the utility and allocated budget of DS i are both 0.
In other words, we can simplify this model by removing the zero bidding data sources.
Definition 3: Let r < R be the number of positive bidding data sources. Without loss of generality, it can be redefined that the data sources
, and their bidding n = (n i ) r i=1 > 0. The data trading model modified by definition 3 can simplify the result of Theorem 3 as follows:
Corollary 2: Suppose that b * > 0 is a NE of the game (3), then ν is as follows:
Proof: From third condition of (4),
Corollary 3: Suppose that b * > 0 is a NE of the game (3), then the scalar ν derived by KKT conditions and the scalar ρ defined at (4) are actually same, i.e., ν = ρ.
Proof: First, from the first condition of (4), we can obtain this equation:
Otherwise, from (12), we can obtain this equation:
Therefore, ρ is the same as ν Corollary 2 and 3 show the exact value of ν and the relation between ν and ρ. These corollaries allow us to obtain the exact n * .
Theorem 4: Suppose that b * > 0 is a NE of the game (3), then exact value of the n * = (n * i ) r i=1 is as follows:
In this case, the total amount of raw data n * = r i=1 n * i is as follows:
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Moreover, using the equation (6) and (13),
Since we assume positive bidding of data sources in definition 3, the NE n * i in (14) must be positive. Thus, our data market model must satisfy the following two inequalities.
Competition requires at least two competitors, so it is natural to satisfy the first inequality r > 1. The second inequality can be written as j =i γ j > (r − 2)γ i , and that will be a hint to estimate a concrete γ i , for all i ∈ [1, r]. More detailed analysis of the γ i setting will be discussed in Chapter V.
IV. OPTIMAL PRICING
In this section, we define a new profit function and prove an optimization problem from the perspective of the service provider. In order to define a new profit function, the service provider must consider income and expenses. The income can be obtained by multiplying the subscription fee by the expected number of subscribers; the expenses can be obtained by adding budget and data processing costs. Most of these values are easy to calculate, but estimating the expected number of subscribers is not.
Customers decide whether to subscribe based on the quality of the refined data and the subscription fee. The first factor will be estimated by defining the data quality function φ later in (17) . As the budget of the service provider increases, the amount of raw data to be received increases according to (15) , and the quality of the refined data also improves. In addition, the second factor should be approached from an economic point of view. Since the price of the market depends on the law of demand, the service provider must set reasonable subscription fees. When the subscription fee goes up, the demand from the customers falls; conversely, when the subscription fee goes down, the demand from the customers rises.
Therefore, profit function F shall be defined with two variables B and s, and the service provider optimizes F to maximize its own profit.
A. DATA QUALITY FUNCTION
First, we define a data quality function φ before defining profit function F. According to machine learning and data mining, it is a hard and complicated process to extract good information from raw data. But the method of data processing is not our approach; we are interested in refined data, that is, the result of data processing. Thus, we define φ to estimate the gap between the refined data and the real data; in other words, this means accuracy. Therefore, we apply two principles to define the function φ. The first is a characteristic of machine learning: the higher the number of examples, the higher the accuracy [36] . The second is the law of diminishing marginal utility: the marginal utility diminishes as the supply increases [37] . Since both concave and strictly increasing conditions may represent these two principles, φ should be a strictly increasing and concave function. These two principles are reasonable since the distribution of real-world data has strictly increasing and concave conditions, and the real world data can be well approximated by well-defined data quality function from [3] .
Definition 4: Data quality function is defined as follows:
where α and β are constant parameters. Then, φ(n) ∈ [0, 1]. Now we analyze the parameters α and β as defined above. First we put n = 0 into φ(n); then, we obtain φ(0) = 1 − α. This means the α is used to set the lower bound of the function. In other words, even though there exists a small amount of raw data, data processing with φ guarantees accuracy of at least 1−α. On the other hand, since β is an exponential value, the β is used to set the rate of increase. That is, the higher the value of β is, the sharper the φ value is. Figure 3 shows the data quality function φ for variant parameters α and β. Different colored solid lines represent the variation of α = (0.25, 0.5, 0.75) with fixed β = 0.04, and different types of black lines represent variation of β = (0.04, 0.08, 0.12) with fixed α = 0.5.
Note that we have supposed that the total amount of raw data n * is an NE in Definition 2, then n * = νB by (15) .
Because the value ν is defined by data source strategies, it is just a constant value from the perspective of the service provider, and it can be possible to express φ in terms of B by replacing n * = νB. In other words, we can redefine the data quality function (17) with variable B as follows:
B. EXPECTED NUMBER OF SUBSCRIBERS
As we explained above, customers determine whether of not to use the service by data quality and subscription fee.
As higher data quality is considered more desirable, the number of subscribers is in direct proportion to the data quality.
On the other hand, the subscription fee and the number of subscribers are in inverse proportion to each other, because of the law of demand. Thus, from the view of the service provider, the number of subscribers can be predicted using these proportion factors.
Since we already defined a data quality function, the only thing left is to define the inverse relationship between subscription fee and the number of subscribers. More precisely, the customers probabilistically decide whether to subscribe by comparing the subscription fee and their WTP. Thus, we adopt a log-normal distribution(LND) to express this process mathematically. Since a lot of natural phenomena follow the LND, it is useful for practically modeling this process. Therefore, we can define the inverse relationship under the assumption that WTP follows an LND [30] . It implies that most service users will subscribe at very low prices; most of them will not subscribe at very high prices; however, those who cancel their subscriptions will fluctuate more depending on price fluctuations near the appropriate price.
We assume that X means the customer's maximal payment (i.e., WTP). Thus, let X be a positive random variable, and it follows an LND. By definition, the cumulative distribution function F(s) of the random variable X means the probability that X is less than or equal to s, as follows:
where the erf(x) is the error function used in measure theory. Since we assume X means WTP, P(X ≤ s) means the probability of not subscribing when the subscription fee is s. Therefore, the probability of subscribing when the subscription fee is s is expressed as 1 − P(X ≤ s) = P(X > s), as follows:
As a result, (19) expresses the subscription probability of the customer with respect to the subscription fee. If the number of customers C is multiplied by (19) , the result represents the inverse relationship between the subscription fee and the number of subscribers. Moreover, the formula can be used flexibly by adjusting the µ and σ values in accordance with the situation. For the sake of convenience, we now assume µ = 0 and σ = 1 in this section.
Added to this, by multiplying by a data quality function (17) , which is another proportional factor, the expected number of subscribers can be predicted from the view of the service provider, as follows: Figure 4 shows the expected number of subscribers (20) for subscription fee s and data size n. This indicates that the overall expected number of subscribers is low, when the accuracy of the data is poor due to the small amount of the data. However, even when the accuracy of the data is good, the expected number of subscribers decreases as the subscription fee increases. 
C. PROFIT FUNCTION
To define the profit function F, we should consider the income and expenses of the service provider. The income is the product of the subscription fee s and the expected number of subscribers (20) . The expenses are both budget B and the data processing costs. To account for the cost of data processing, we denote a new factor p that is the price of data processing per 1 unit of data. Since the cost of data processing is proportional to the amount of raw data, the cost of processing data n is pn. Note that we suppose that the total amount of raw data n * is a NE, then n * = νB by (15) . Thus the total expenses are B + pνB = (1 + pν)B, in this case. As a result, the profit function of the service provider is represented as follows:
We assume that the received raw data n * is an NE, and so the data quality function φ is expressed in terms of B by (18) . VOLUME 6, 2018 Therefore, the profit function is defined with two variables B and s, as follows:
D. OPTIMIZATION
Now we prove an optimization problem of the profit func- tion F(s, B) . First, using the analytical method to show that the second order derivative is negative, we prove that F(s, B) is a concave function for s and B. Thus, F(s, B) has a global maximum, which is the largest value of the function. Next, we solve the optimization problem by using the gradient decent method through the numerical method. The gradient descent method is a popular one, and numerically solves problems through a computer program. First, take a first derivative of F(s, B) with respect to s and B; then we have
When these two equations are 0 simultaneously, there are some possibilities of critical point over positive s and B. One of them is the global maximum point F(s, B), but we skip this because there is a limit to hand calculation in the analytical method. Next, take a second derivative of F(s, B) with respect to s and B; then we have
Since these two equations are negative, F(s, B) is a concave function. Therefore, there is a unique maximum point, and the equation has an optimal solution. In addition, we can find the unique maximum point (s * , B * ) and the unique maximum value F(s * , B * ) by using the gradient descent method. In this process, we used the MAT-LAB program to find the optimal solution for the parameters in Table 3 , as follows:
And we will check that these values are correct in the next section.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we will analyze whether the mathematical proof in the data market model is correct. Moreover, by using certain graphs, we will verify visually whether the NE of the Stackelberg game is correct and whether the optimal point of the optimization problem is correct.
A. PARAMETER SELECTION
In order to analyzie the proposed market model, we configure parameters C, p, α, β, r, and γ as follows:
• Since the C affects only the size of the resulting values, there are relatively few restrictions on the parameter selection. Thus, we just set the number of customers C = 500. Also, for the sake of convenience, we set µ = 0 and σ = 1 which are the variables of LND.
• For the data quality function, based on a real-world data as in [3] , which consists of accelerometer and gyroscope samples collected from smart phones, we set the parameters α = 0.5 and β = 0.04. It should be noted that the work in [3] used both support vector machines and logistic regression as classification algorithm.
• The work in [38] provided an analysis of data processing cost, which revealed that the data processing costs are 0.5 to 0.8 times the data collection costs. Thus, following those results, we set the unit price of the data processing p = 0.5.
• The other two parameters r and γ must be set considering inequality (16) . According to the second inequality of (16), γ i must be satisfied following inequality
and so it is determined depending on r and j =i γ j .
If not, there is a negative bidding for the ith data source so, by definition 3, the game between the data sources and the service provider is not valid. Analyzing these figures, it can be seen that negative biddings occur when there is a great difference between γ values. In this case, the game between the data sources and the service provider is not valid, because the bidding of data sources must be positive. These results can be interpreted as follows: since the γ represents the risk of data leakage, data sources with high risk(large γ ) are reluctant to play the game with data sources with low risk(small γ ). In addition, when comparing Figures 5 and 6, the DS 3 of Figure 5 has positive bidding at γ 1 values from 0.45 to 0.9. On the other hand, the DS 5 of Figure 6 has only negative bidding at γ 1 values up to 0.9. This shows that although the two γ values are identical to 0.9, the bidding data can be different depending on both the number of data sources and on the other γ values. Therefore, in order for the game to be valid, we should set all γ to a similar level under appropriate r. Mathematically, if γ j ≈ γ i , for all j = i, then the inequality (23) is represented as follows:
and thus the game is valid. For example, Figure 7 shows that if the γ j , for j = 1 values are set to be similar to each other, then all data sources have positive bidding on γ 1 ∈ [0.35, 0.65]. Based on the results of Figure 7 , we decided to set γ i by (0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6). As a result, we set up undefined parameters C, p, α, β, r, and γ as shown in Table 2 . 
B. THEORETICAL EXPERIMENT
Here, we will check whether the result of the optimization problem is actually optimized under the assumption of NE n * i . Next, by using optimized B, we will check that the NE b * i and n * i actually achieves the maximized utility of each data source.
First, from the perspective of the service provider, the optimization problem of the profit function F(s, B) was already solved in (22) . The service provider's optimal strategy (1.35, 23.79) can be obtained using the gradient descent method in the MATLAB program; and then, the service provider's maximum profit 186.93 can be obtained by substituting the optimal point into F(s, B) . Figure 8 shows the service provider's profit function F for the two variables s and B; and the optimization problem can be verified visually through in this figure. We can see that F(s, B) is a concave function for both variables and has a globally unique maximum value 186.93 at (1.35, 23.79). Next, the exact value of NE b * i and n * i can be obtained by substituting the budget B = 23.79, obtained from the above optimization problem, into (12) and (14) . Moreover, these values determine the total amount of data received by the service provider, the maximum utility of each data source, and the unit price of the data. The results are shown in Table 3 ; we will verify the mathematical proofs using the obtained value now.
First, if the revenue b * i given to DS i is NE, according to the third condition of (4), the total sum of b * i must be budget B. Actually, the sum of the revenues is rounded to 23.8, which is the same as budget B obtained from the optimization problem. Second, if the bidding data n * i is NE, according to (6) , the value that is obtained by dividing the total sum of n * i by the budget B must be equal to ρ. Actually, (
Third, by setting the gamma of all the data sources to be similar to each other, all data sources have positive bidding; thus, they all have positive maximum utilities. Furthermore, in order to verify that these maximum utilities are actually the largest values, we introduce Figure 9 . Figure 9 shows the change of utilities according to the variation of bidding for each data source; this figure visually shows that the utility of each data source actually has a maximum value in the NE n * i .
FIGURE 9.
The change of utilities according to the variation of bidding for each data source.
C. EXPERIMENT: POSTURE ASSESSMENT DATA
In the previous steps, we have checked that the proposed model is well defined, the optimization problem is truly globally optimized, and the NE points actually maximize the utility of the data source. In this step, we use a real-world data [8] , [38] , [39] to implement the proposed model. The data used in these papers are the trunk and shoulder postures of workers collected for 80 working days in three different methods; using inclinometer, observation from video film, and self-report via questionnaire. The data collection methods and costs are described in [8] , the data processing methods and costs are in [38] , and the collected data can be found in [39] . According to [8] , to collect the same amount of data for 80 working days, the inclinometer method requires ¿65K(kilo-euros), the observation method requires ¿56K, and the questionnaire method requires ¿37K.
Now we apply these results to our model and try to implement them by regulating the parameters. First, we assume that there are three data sources and collect data using the inclinometer, observation, and questionnaire methods, respectively. To avoid confusion, denote three data sources as follows: DS inc is a data source using the inclinometer method, DS obs is a data source using the observation method, DS que is a data source using the questionnaire method.
The inclinometer method is the most costly to collect data due to the equipment, however, it has the advantage of multitasking and collecting data simultaneously. In contrast, the questionnaire method is the cheapest due to the simple collection method, however, it is quite less efficient in measuring the data. Lastly, the cost and efficiency of the observation method is about halfway between those of the other two methods. Since the more difficult to collect the data, the greater the risk of data leakage, we assume that γ inc ≤ γ obs ≤ γ que . In addition, with reference to inequalities (23) and (24), we set the gamma parameters as follows; γ inc = 0.3, γ obs = 0.4, and γ que = 0.5.
According to [38] , inclinometer method were collected 80 days of data, but 79 were successfully processed due to intractable noise. The other methods were fully processed for 80 days. Thus, we can expect the accuracy of the data quality function φ to be 239/240 = 0.995 when 240 days of data are input, and the parameters of the function is set as follows; α = 0.7, β = 0.0206. Moreover, since the costs of all methods for collections are ¿100K and costs of all methods for processing are ¿52K(except the common costs), pν = p * 2 1.2 = 0.52 by equation (13) . Thus we set the unit price of data processing p = 0.312.
For realistic implementation, we change the mean and standard deviation values of LND to µ = 0.6439 and σ = 0.2342 introduced in [40] . Also we change the number of customers to C = 1000 in order to regulate the size of the result. All other parameter values will be used in the same way. As a result, in this section, we set up the parameters as shown in table 4.
The implementation results for the posture assessment data are shown in Table 5 , and the table is divided into data sources, a service provider, and customers. Each group chosen their own strategy by optimization problem and NE, and the numerical values corresponding to each group is filled in the table.
From the table 5, the data sources group receive the service provider's budget through the bidding data, where each utility by bidding data of 22.68 days. Next, the service provider is determined by the optimization problem to have subscription fee ¿1.459K and budget ¿81.64K, and according to the NE, 136.07 days of data are received by the data sources group. Thus, the service provider's profit is determined by (21) , and it gains ¿865.59K. Lastly, the data that the customers are received by subscribing to the service provider have a quality of 0.9935 by (17) . At this time, the number of subscribers is determined as 709.65 by (20) , and approximately 710 customers are expected to use these services.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a three hierarchical levels big-data market model that consists of multiple data sources, a service provider, and customers. We have designed a rigorous game theoretic model to derive the unique NE point of the market participants. We also designed realistic WTP by following LND, so the expected number of subscribers can be calculated practically. The analytic results have demonstrated that our proposed approach is guaranteed to have a unique equilibrium point that maximizes the payoff for all market participants. As our future work, multiple service providers can be considered to extend our model. Moreover, block chain technique can also be applied to design a fully decentralized structure where all components are either producers or consumers.
